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By failing to apply properly the jurisdictional predicate contained in CPL § 20.20(2)(b), it is submitted that the Corsino court
extended New York's extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to a situation not envisioned by the legislature' 2 nor justified by the language of the statute. 3 It is hoped that future decisions will adhere
to the test established by the CPL and thereby limit criminal jurisdiction to the bounds prescribed by the legislature.
FAMILY COURT

ACT

Family Court Act §§ 413-414: Divorced mother must share in the
financial support of her children.
As a consequence of the current focus upon equal treatment of
the sexes,' 4 courts have been faced with an increasingly large number of equal protection challenges directed at statutes employing
sex-based classifications.'25 It is not surprising, therefore, that sections 413121 and 414127 of the Family Court Act, which seem to place
the primary obligation for child support upon the father,' 2 have
122See

note 118 supra.
notes 114-118 and accompanying text supra.
I For a general overview of the changing status of women and the effects of the women's
rights movement see W. CHAFE, WOMEN AND EQUALITY (1977). See generally CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, IMPACT ERA LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 144-215 (1976);
S. FELDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 31-71 (1974); I. MURPHY, PUBLIC POLICY ON THE STATUS OF
122See

WOMEN

19-100 (1973);

THE WOMEN'S MovEMENT

41-63 (H. Wortis & C. Rabinowitz eds. 1972).

See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
New York courts also have been confronted with equal protection attacks upon various statutes. See, e.g., People v. Moss, 80 Misc. 2d 633, 366 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1975); In re Louise B., 68 Misc. 2d 95, 326 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1971).
Moreover, passage of the New York Human Rights Law, codified in N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 290301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976-1977), has led to the invalidation of several statutory
distinctions based upon sex. See, e.g., Board of Ed. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 App.
Div. 2d 49, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd mem., 35 N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360
N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974).
,21 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part:
The father of a child under the age of twenty-one years is chargeable with the
support of his child and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means,
may be required to pay for such child's support a fair and reasonable sum according
to his means, as the court may determine.
12, Id. § 414 states that
[i]f the father of a child is dead, incapable of supporting his child, or cannot
be found within the state, the mother of such child is chargeable with its support
where such child has not attained the age of twenty-one years and, if possessed of
sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be required to pay for its support
a fair and reasonable sum according to her means, as the court may determine. The
court may. apportion the costs of the support of the child between the parents
according to their respective means and responsibilities.
'" Prior decisions, reflecting the early common law position, found that the obligation
1'
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been attacked on equal protection grounds and declared unconstitutional by at least one New York court.'2 9 Recently, however, in
Carter v. Carter,'31 the Appellate Division, Second Department,
declined an invitation to strike down as unconstitutional these two
sections of the Family Court Act, opting instead to construe the
statutory provisions "as meaning that both the father and the
mother are equally responsible for the support of their children" and
that such support may be apportioned between the parents "in
accordance with their respective means and responsibilities
"131

of support has been the father's "since time immemorial." Lewis v. Lewis, 2 Misc. 2d 849,
851, 151 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956), aff'd mem., 5 App. Div. 2d 674,
168 N.Y.S..2d 473 (2d Dep't 1957), appeal dismissed mem., 4 N.Y.2d 872, 150 N.E.2d 710,
174 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1958). See Drazin v. Drazin, 31 App. Div. 2d 531, 295 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1st
Dep't 1968) (mem.) (primary duty of support rests upon the father irrespective of mother's
financial condition); County of Santa Clara v. Hughes, 43 Misc. 2d 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Family Ct. Ulster County 1964) (father has absolute responsibility for support of minor
children); Smith v. Jones, 43 Misc. 2d 350, 250 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Family Ct. Kings County 1964)
(father not relieved of duty by separation agreement). In view of the common law rule, courts
have literally construed Family Court Act §§ 413 and 414, and concluded that a mother
cannot be charged with support of her child unless the father "is dead, incapable of supporting his child, or cannot be found within the state." N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §414 (McKinney 1975).
See Haslett v. Haslett, 25 App. Div. 2d 256, 268 N.Y.S:2d 809 (3d Dep't 1966) (since father
incapable of support mother required to contribute); In re Trust of Garcy, 19 App. Div. 2d
811, 243 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1st Dep't 1963) (mem.) (obligation of father terminates upon death
and mother held chargeable for support). In some cases the judiciary has modified this strict
interpretation of § 414 and ruled that both parents may be responsible for the support of their
child, but retained the notion that the father is primarily obligated since he is likely to be in
a better financial position to bear these costs. See, e.g., Earle v. Earle, 158 App. Div. 552,
554, 143 N.Y.S. 841, 843 (2d Dep't 1913).
I" See Carole K. v. Arnold K., 85 Misc. 2d 643, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County), modified, 87 Misc. 2d 547, 385 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1976). Carole
K. involved a 1960 divorce agreement under which the father had made substantial payments
for the support of his two sons. When the father discontinued these payments in 1975,
presumably because of a reduction in his income, the mother instituted an action for child
support under §§ 413 and 414. Relying on several Supreme Court cases in which sex-related
statutory classifications were held unconstitutional, see cases cited in note 125 supra, the
family court concluded that § 414 is violative of the equal protection clause because no
"rational basis" exists for placing the principal responsibility for support on the father. 85
Misc. 2d at 645, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 597. Accord, Bauer v. Bauer, 55 App. Div. 2d 895, 896, 390
N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.) (Latham, J., concurring). Although the majority
in Bauer refused to strike dovn §§ 413 and 414 in deference to the statute's presumption of
validity, id., 390 N.Y.S.2d at 210-11, Justice Latham, in a concurring opinion, expressed the
view that recent Supreme Court decisions dictated a finding of unconstitutionality. Id. at 897,
390 N.Y.S.2d at 211-12.
'
58 App. Div. 2d 438, 397 N.Y.S.2d 88 (2d Dep't 1977).
z' Id. at 447, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 93-94. In January, 1977, the second department, perhaps
anticipating the Carterdecision, ruled in Bauer v. Bauer, 55 App. Div. 2d 895, 390 N.Y.S.2d
209 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.) that although the principal duty of support is upon the father,
the obligation may be apportioned between the two parents in relation to their means. Id. at
896, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
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Carterinvolved a support proceeding commenced by the father,
who had been awarded custody of the couple's minor son following
a divorce in 1973. Both parents stipulated that the only issue in the
case concerned the constitutionality of sections 413 and 414. Finding
that a father is primarily responsible for the support of his child
under sections 413 and 414, the family court summarily rejected the
constitutional challenge and dismissed the father's support petition.'3 2 In reversing the decision of the lower court, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, repudiated several New York decisions which had interpreted sections 413 and 414 as relieving the
mother of any obligation for support unless the father is dead, incapable of support, or not within the state.' 33 Justice Shapiro, writing for the court, was of the opinion that such a literal reading of
the statutory scheme would render it unconstitutional -under recent
Supreme Court decisions involving sex-based differential treatment.'34 As an alternative, the court, invoking a well-established
canon of statutory construction,' 3 determined that the two sections
,"2 58 App. Div. 2d at 443, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The lower court, which apparently never
issued an opinion, concluded that the sections in question were constitutional without any
discussion of the issue. Id.
11 Id. at 444, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 92. See note 128 supra. Before rendering its decision with
respect to the support issue, the appellate division confronted the question whether the
attorney general should have been notified of the constitutional challenge to the Family Court
Act. See N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 71 (McKinney 1972) which, provides in part:
Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is brought into question upon the
trial or hearing of any action or proceeding. . . in any court of record. . . the court
or justice before whom such action or proceeding is pending, may make an order,
directing the party desiring to raise such question, to serve notice thereof on the
attorney-general and that the attorney-general be permitted to appear at any such
trial or hearing in support of the constitutionality of such statute.
Id. (emphasis added). The family court had deemed application of the statute to be within
its discretion and concluded that it was unnecessary to notify the attorney general as neither
party had requested such notice. The appellate division disagreed, finding that the lower
court had exceeded its authority in failing to order notice "since the purpose of the statute is
to have all of the people of the State represented when the constitutionality of their laws are
put in issue." 58 App. Div. 2d at 442 n.1, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 90-91 n.1. See also Jerry v. Syracuse
Bd. of Educ., 44 App. Div. 2d 198, 354 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dep't), modified on othergrounds,
35 N.Y.2d 534, 324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974) (failure to give notice precluded
determination of the constitutionality of certain statutes).
'" 58 App. Div. 2d at 447-48, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 94. For a discussion of the Supreme Court
cases, see notes 141-142 and accompanying text infra.
"5 See note 142 and accompanying text infra. Courts generally will endeavor to construe
statutory language in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. See, e.g., In re
Barry Equity Corp., 276 App. Div. 685, 96 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1950); People v. Vitale,
80 Misc. 2d 36, 360 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Nassau County Ct. 1974). It has been stated that
"a legislative enactment carries with it an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality; that, while this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must
be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt; that every intendment is in favor of
the statute's validity; that the party alleging unconstitutionality has a heavy bur-
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should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Constitution. 36 Therefore, the appellate division concluded that the portion
of section 414 requiring a mother to support her child upon the
death, financial incapacity, or absence of the father is not an exclusive statement of the mother's obligation;, 13 as 414 further provides,
a "'court may apportion the costs of the support of the child between the parents according to their respective means and responsibilities.' ""3"

Assuming, however, that section 414 may be read as imposing
only a secondary obligation upon the mother, Justice Shapiro stated
that the statute can be sustained by- holding that the death, incapacity, or absence of the father is not a condition "precedent to a
mother's becoming subject to contribution [for support] in accordance with her means.'

'1 9

To further support its decision, the court

pointed out that this construction of the Family Court Act comports
with section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law, which permits the
court in any matrimonial action to direct that costs incurred for the
maintenance and education of the child be borne by 'either or both
. . .parents.'"4

den; and that only as a last resort will courts strike down legislative enactments
on the ground of unconstitutionality."
Marcia D. v. Donald D., 85 Misc. 2d 637, 639, 380 N.Y.S.2d 904,906 (Family Ct. N.Y. County
1976) (quoting In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 570, 331 N.E.2d 486, 488, 370 N.Y.S.2d
511, 514 (1975)). See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Panama R.R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390 (1924); People v. Pickett, 19 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 225 N.E.2d 509,
512, 278 N.Y.S.2d 802, 805 (1967).
'
58 App. Div. 2d at 448, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
" Past decisions considered the opening sentence of § 414, which places the duty of
support on the mother if the father is dead, incapable of supporting the child, or not within
the state, to be merely an explication of the father's primary responsibility as set forth in §
413. See Drazin v. Drazin, 31 App. Div. 2d 531, 532, 295 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (1st Dep't 1968)
(mem.); Novikoff v. Novikoff, 29 App. Div. 2d 754, 287 N.Y.S.2d 697 (2d Dep't 1968) (mem.);
Carole K. v. Arnold K., 85 Misc. 2d 643, 644, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (Family Ct. N.Y. County),
modified, 87 Misc. 2d 547, 385 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
"'- 58 App. Div. 2d at 446, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 93 (quoting N.Y. FAm. CT. ACr § 414 (McKinney 1975)). Section 413 does not place an absolute duty to support the child on the father,
but instead, provides that the father "may be required to pay" child support, N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACr § 413 (McKinney 1975) (emphasis added). This consideration, together with the fact that
§ 414 prescribes the mother's support obligation in similar language, led the court to conclude
that either parent may be charged with support. 58 App. Div. 2d at 446, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
''
58 App. Div. 2d at 446-47, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
Id. at 447, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (quoting DRL § 240) (emphasis supplied by the court).
t
Section 240 vests the Supreme Court with broad discretion to direct the custody and care of
a child according to the circumstances of the case.
It is interesting to note that the Cartercourt's construction of the statute also coincides
with the alimony provisions of the Domestic Relations Law, DRL § 236, under which "the
ability of the wife to be self-supporting" is a factor in the award of alimony. Although the
economic status of the wife is not dispositive on the issue of alimony, it should be a significant
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By interpreting sections 413 and 414 as placing equal responsibility for support on both parents, the Carter court obviated the
necessity for resolving a serious constitutional question. Decisions
of the Supreme Court applying the equal protection clause indicate
that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'' Had
the appellate division read 413 and 414 to impose the principal duty
of support upon the father, it is suggested that the sections would
not have been able to survive this constitutional test. In opting for
a construction that places the statutes beyond constitutional attack, the Carter court has employed a technique previously utilized
by the Supreme Court to sustain legislative enactments in the equal
42
protection area.
In addition to its consistency with modern concern for sexual
equality, the Carterholding would seem to foster the welfare of the
consideration. Phillips v. Phillips, 1 App. Div. 2d 393, 397-98, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646, 651 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 742, 138 N.E.2d 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956). See Kover v.
Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278 N.E.2d 886, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972) (alimony not granted where
there were no children and wife's income equalled that of husband).
"' Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Statutes discriminating on the basis of sex are
evaluated under an equal protection standard less severe than that applied when a suspect
classification or fundamental right is involved, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
but more rigorous than the traditional "rational basis" test, see, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961). As enunciated by the Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), a genderrelated classification is unconstitutional unless it bears a "'fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.' " Id. at 92. Applying this standard in the recent decision of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976), the Court held that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males
under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 could not be sustained. Despite
statistics demonstrating that males between the ages of 18 and 20 were involved in more
traffic accidents and arrests stemming from alcohol use than were females in that age group,
the Craig Court ruled that the disparity which exists with respect to males and females who
drive while under the influence of alcohol was insufficient to support the conclusion "that
sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving." Id. at
204. In short, "the relationship between sex and traffic safety becomes far too tenuous to
satisfy Reed's requirement that the gender-based difference be substantially related to
achievement of the statutory objective." Id.
"I2See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security benefits
equally extended to widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (dependency no
longer required for husbands of female members of the Armed Forces to receive medical
benefits and quarters allowances); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits granted to persons who have resided within the state less than one year); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimate children allowed to share in award of parent's wrongful
death benefits). See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 913 (1971).

1977]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

child by increasing the potential sources of support funds;1 3 on the
basis of the decision, both parents will be required to contribute
support payments according to their financial capabilities."' It is
submitted, therefore, that the Carter court has adopted a reasonable and desirable interpretation of Family Court Act sections 413
and 414 which hopefully will be accepted by other New York courts.
INSURANCE LAW
Legislature amends New York's No-Fault Statute
In order to insure prompt and equitable compensation for victims of automobile accidents, and reduce the necessity for expensive
personal injury litigation, the legislature in 1973 adopted a "nofault" insurance statute. 4 5 Although some authorities heralded this
legislative enactment as an insurance premium reducing device,
recent years have witnessed a steady increase in the cost of automobile insurance.' Prompted by these rising costs, as well as abuses
of the original statute,'4 7 the New York Legislature recently
amended the no-fault law,' effecting significant changes in the
statutory scheme.
"I See Bauer v. Bauer, 55 App. Div. 2d 895, 897, 390 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212 (2d Dep't 1977)
(mem.) (Latham, J., concurring). DRL § 240 directs the supreme court in any marital action
to consider "the best interests of the child" in determining the award for custody and support.
See O'Shea v. Brennan, 88 Misc. 2d 233, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976)
wherein the court noted that children should be afforded "[t]he right to the most adequate
level of economic support that can be provided by the best efforts of both parents." Id. at
236, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
I" See Fox, Divorcee Held Liable to Share Child Support with Ex-Husband, N.Y.L.J.,
July 26, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
"I Ch. 13, §§ 1-11, [1973] N.Y. LAWS 56. See Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 4951, 340 N.E.2d 444, 448-50, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7-9 (1975); Governor's Memorandum on Approval
of ch. 13, N.Y. Laws (Feb. 13, 1973), reprinted in [1973] N.Y. Laws 2335 (McKinney).
148See, e.g., Cerra, Auto Premiums Up 100% for Many New Yorkers, N.Y. Times, July
25, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
" Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in [1977] N.Y. Laws 2445,
2452 (McKinney).
"' Ch. 892, §§ 1-17, [1977] N.Y. Laws 1824 (McKinney). According to the State Executive Department, the purpose of the legislation is:
To amend the State's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Law to eliminate various costly abuses, more adequately protect the victims of uninsured drivers, permit
greater protection for insured drivers; and to contain the costs of automobile comprehensive and collision coverages by requiring insurers to inspect automobiles,
verify their existence and determine their values in advance of loss; and to make
other appropriate changes in the automobile insurance system.
Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in [1977] N.Y. Laws 2445 (McKinney). The need for a change in the law has been recognized by authorities who have realized
the many problems created by the original statute. One commentator has noted that:

